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a b s t r a c t
This paper shows that the inhabitation problem in the lambda calculus with negation,
product, polymorphic, and existential types is decidable, where the inhabitation problem
asks whether there exists some term that belongs to a given type. In order to do that,
this paper proves the decidability of the provability in the logical system defined from
the second-order natural deduction by removing implication and disjunction. This is
proved by showing the quantifier elimination theorem and reducing the problem to the
provability in propositional logic. The magic formulas are used for quantifier elimination
such that they replace quantifiers. As a byproduct, this paper also shows the second-order
witness theorem which states that a quantifier followed by negation can be replaced by
a witness obtained only from the formula. As a corollary of the main results, this paper
also shows Glivenko’s theorem, Double Negation Shift, and conservativity for antecedent-
empty sequents between the logical system and its classical version.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Existential types are important in computer science and have been studied actively for a long time. The reference [8]
showed that abstract data types are existential types. The reference [7] investigated a conversion translation by using
existential types. Recently the reference [3] showed that there is a Galois correspondence between the polymorphic typed
lambda calculus, that is the system F, and the type system with existential types. The references [6,10,11] found a simple
proof of strong normalization in type systems that contain existential types.
Inhabitation, type checking, and type inference of existential typeswere not known to be decidable until last year. For the
system F, the inhabitation was proved to be undecidable [5,15], and the type checking and the type inference were proved
to be undecidable [16]. In addition, the reference [1] proved that the inhabitation is decidable in a type systemwith positive
polymorphic types. On the other hand, though existential types are dual to polymorphic types, we did not know anything
about inhabitation, type checking, or type inference of existential types until last year [9,12].
The type systemwith¬∧∃ is useful since it is an essence of a CPS target calculus. The reference [9] pointed out that this
system works as a target calculus for many CPS translations from various systems, for example, call-by-value second-order
computationalλ-calculus and call-by-valueλµ-calculus [9], the polymorphic typedλ-calculus [3], and theλµ-calculus [2,4].
In this paper, we will investigate the type system with negation, product, polymorphic and existential types, which is
obtained from the systemproposed in the references [3,9,12] by adding polymorphic types, and show that the inhabitation of
that system is decidable. Wewill also show that the inhabitation is also decidable whenwe add the bottom elimination rule
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to that system. These results are obtained by studying the corresponding logical systems and showing that their provability is
decidable. In order to prove this, wewill show the quantifier elimination theorem, which says that any formula is equivalent
to some formula without quantifiers. So the decidability of provability in these systems is reduced to that in minimal
propositional logic and intuitionistic propositional logic.
The decidability of the inhabitation in the type systemwith¬∧∃ is interesting [12], because its dual system is the system
F whose inhabitation is undecidable [5,15]. This system can interpret the system F by CPS-translation, and this translation
gives a Galois correspondence between the system F and this system [3]. Although this fact shows that this system is closely
related to the system F and has expressive power, we will show that this system even combined with polymorphic types
turns out to be decidable.
Our proof of the quantifier elimination will use interesting formulas ¬A[X := T] and ¬¬A[X := T], which we will call
magic formulas since they will magically give witnesses without using proof information. We will replace quantifiers by
magic formulas.
As a byproduct of our proofs, we will also show a second-order witness theorem, which states that ∃X¬A implies
¬A[X := B]where B is themagic formula¬A[X := T]. This is surprising because in first-order intuitionistic logic, thewitness
t such that¬A[x := t] holds can be obtained from the proof of ∃x¬A and it cannot be obtained only from the formula ∃x¬A.
On the other hand, our second-order witness theorem says that the witness is effectively computed from the formula A
itself. We will also have a second-order witness theorem for universal quantification, which states that¬A[X =: B] implies
∀X¬A where B is the magic formula ¬¬A[X := T]. This means that we do not have to think of all the possible formulas for
X; it is enough to think of ¬¬A[T] instead.
Section 2 defines the type system λ¬ ∧ ∀∃ with negation, product, polymorphic, and existential types and gives the
decidable inhabitation theorem. Section 3 defines the corresponding logical system J¬ ∧ ∀∃. In Section 4, we provide magic
formulas and prove the quantifier elimination theorem. Section 5 proves the decidable inhabitation theorem for λ¬ ∧ ∀∃
as well as the decidability of the provability for J¬ ∧ ∀∃, Glivenko’s theorem, the double-negation-shift theorem, and the
conservativity theorem. Section 6 investigates the logical system with ¬ ∧ ∃, and Section 7 discusses the type system and
the logical system with⊥. Section 8 shows the second-order witness theorem in various logical systems.
2. The type system with¬ ∧ ∀∃
We will define the type system λ¬ ∧ ∀∃ with negation, product, polymorphic, and existential types, and state the
decidability of the inhabitation in this system.
We have variables x, y, z, . . . for λ-terms. λ-terms are defined by
M,N, . . . ::= x|λx.M|MM|〈M,M〉|pi0M|pi1M|〈∃,M〉|M[x.M].
〈M,N〉 is a pair. pi0M and pi1M are the first projection and the second projection respectively. 〈∃,M〉 is a construction term
for existential types.M[x.N] is an elimination term for existential types.
We have type variables X, Y , Z, . . .. Types are defined by
A, B, . . . ::= X |⊥|¬A|A ∧ A|∀XA|∃XA.
⊥ is a type constant for negation.¬A is the negation type andmeans the type of a function from A to⊥. A∧B is a product type,
∀XA is a polymorphic type, and ∃XA is an existential type. SubstitutionsM[x := N] and A[X := B] denote capture-avoiding
substitutions that replace x by N inM and X by B in A.
The system has the following inference rules:
[x : A]....
M : ⊥
λx.M : ¬A (¬I)
M : ¬A N : A
MN : ⊥ (¬E)
M : A N : B
〈M,N〉 : A ∧ B (∧I)
M : A ∧ B
pi0M : A (∧E1)
M : A ∧ B
pi1M : B (∧E2)
M : A
M : ∀XA (∀I)
M : ∀XA
M : A[X := B] (∀E)
M : A[X := B]
〈∃,M〉 : ∃XA (∃I)
M : ∃XA
[x : A]....
N : C
M[x.N] : C (∃E)
where the assumptions of the subproof of M : A do not contain any free occurrence of X in the rule (∀I), and neither the
assumptions of the second subproof of N : C except x : A, nor C does not contain any free occurrence of X in the rule (∃E).
The inhabitation problem of types is a question of whether for a given type, there exists some term that belongs to the
type or not.
Theorem 2.1 (Decidability of Inhabitation). The inhabitation in the system λ¬ ∧ ∀∃ is decidable.
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Remark. (1) This theorem says there is an algorithm such that for any given types A, B1, . . . , Bn, this algorithm decides
whether there is some termM such that x1 : B1, . . . , xn : Bn ` M : A is provable.
(2) This result does not conflict with the existence of the CPS translation from the system F to λ¬ ∧ ∀∃, because we have
more proof terms in λ¬ ∧ ∀∃ than the image of the translation. In addition, the translation interprets F with classical logic
in λ¬ ∧ ∀∃.
We will finish proving this theorem in Section 5.
3. Second-order logic without implication or disjunction
Wewill investigate the logical system J¬ ∧ ∀∃ corresponding to the type system λ¬ ∧ ∀∃. This system is obtained from
the type system by dropping terms. We will use this system for proving the decidability of the inhabitation for λ¬ ∧ ∀∃.
We define the system J¬ ∧ ∀∃. It is the second-order natural deduction without implication or disjunction. We have
second-order variables X, Y , Z, . . . . We have the constant ⊥. It does not have any meaning, since this system is based on
minimal logic and does not have the bottom elimination rule. Formulas are the same as types of the type system λ¬ ∧ ∀∃
and defined by
A, B, . . . ::= X |⊥|¬A|A ∧ A|∀XA|∃XA.
The inference rules of the system are given by
[A]....⊥
¬A (¬I)
¬A A
⊥ (¬E)
A B
A ∧ B (∧I)
A ∧ B
A
(∧E1) A ∧ BB (∧E2)
A
∀XA (∀I)
∀XA
A[X := B] (∀E)
A[X := B]
∃XA (∃I)
∃XA
[A]....
C
C
(∃E)
where the assumptions of the subproof of A do not contain any free occurrence of X in the rule (∀I), and neither the
assumptions of the second subproof of C except A, nor C does not contain any free occurrence of X in the rule (∃E).
Two formulas A and B are defined to be equivalent if A is derivable from B and B is derivable from A. We call a formula
quantifier-free if the formula does not contain ∀ or ∃.
In Section 5, we will prove that the provability in the system J¬ ∧ ∀∃ is decidable.
4. Quantifier elimination
In this subsection, we will show the quantifier elimination theorem for J¬ ∧ ∀∃.
First we define abbreviations for coding logical connectives. The connective ∨ is coded in a standard way. We define F
and T which mean falsity and truth respectively.
Definition 4.1. We will use the following abbreviations.
A ∨˜ B = ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B),
F = ⊥,
T = ¬F.
For a logical system J , we write A1, . . . , An `J B to say that B is provable in the system J under the assumptions A1, . . . , An.
We will write A1, . . . , An a`J B1, . . . , Bm for A1, . . . , An `J Bi for all i and B1, . . . , Bm `J Ai for all i. We will sometimes write
` and a` for `J and a`J respectively. We say A1, . . . , An a` B1, . . . , Bm is provable in J when A1, . . . , An a`J B1, . . . , Bm
holds. We will sometimes also write A[B] for A[X := B]. We will use Γ to denote a sequence A1, . . . , An of formulas.
We prepare a basic lemma, which is almost standard and given in the references [13,14]. However, we will give some
details, since we will discuss in J¬ ∧ ∀∃.
Lemma 4.2. (1) A ` ¬¬A.
(2) ¬A a` ¬¬¬A.
(3) ¬¬A ∧ ¬¬B a` ¬¬(A ∧ B).
(4) ¬¬∃XA a` ¬¬∃X¬¬A.
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(5) ` A ∨˜ ¬A.
(6) ¬¬A ∨˜ ¬¬B a` A ∨˜ B.
(7) ¬¬(A ∨˜ B) a` A ∨˜ B.
They are proved in a straightforward way.
The next lemma says that A[B] and A[T] are equivalent when B holds, and¬A[B] and¬A[F] are equivalent when¬B holds
and A is quantifier-free.
Lemma 4.3. (1) B, A[X := B] a` B, A[X := T].
(2) ¬A[X := B] a` ¬A[X := ¬¬B] if A is quantifier-free.
(3) ¬B,¬A[X := B] a` ¬B,¬A[X := F] if A is quantifier-free.
Proof. (1) By induction on A. We will discuss only interesting cases.
Case ∃YA1. By the induction hypothesis, we have B, A1[B] ` A1[T]. Hence we have B, ∃YA1[B] ` ∃YA1[T]. Similarly we
have B, ∃YA1[T] ` ∃YA1[B].
Case ∀YA1 is similar to Case ∃YA1.
(2) By induction on A. Cases are considered according to A. We will discuss only interesting cases.
Case X . The claim holds since¬B a` ¬¬¬B by Lemma 4.2(2).
Case A1 ∧ A2. By the induction hypothesis and Lemma 4.2(2)(3).
(3) We have ¬A[B],¬B a` ¬A[¬¬B],¬B by (2). By letting A be ¬A[¬X] and B be ¬B in (1), we have ¬A[¬¬B],¬B a`
¬A[¬T],¬B. Combining them, we have ¬A[B],¬B a` ¬A[F],¬B. 
We will prove the quantifier elimination theorem. In order to do that, we will first show that the quantifier followed by
negation can be eliminated.
We will use the vector notation Ee to denote a sequence e1, . . . , en (n ≥ 0). We will sometimes use EA to denote a
conjunction A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An of formulas.
The next lemma is a key of our proof. The claim (1) is obtained from Lemma 4.3(1). The claim (2) immediately follows
from (1). This claim is used for proving the claim (3). The claim (3) says that an existential quantifier can be replaced by
disjunction of the true case and the false case like for classical logic. The claim (4) says that a universal quantifier can be
replaced by conjunction of the true case and the false case like for classical logic.
Lemma 4.4. In J¬ ∧ ∀∃, the following hold.
(1) A[X := ¬A[X := T]] a` ¬¬A[X := T], A[X := F].
(2) ¬A[X := ¬A[X := T]] a` ¬A[X := T] ∨˜ ¬A[X := F].
(3) ∃X¬A a` ¬A[X := T] ∨˜ ¬A[X := F] if A is quantifier-free.
(4) ∀X¬A a` ¬A[X := T] ∧ ¬A[X := F] if A is quantifier-free.
Proof. (1) From the left-hand side to the right-hand side. By letting B be¬A[T] in Lemma 4.3(1), we have A[¬A[T]],¬A[T] `
A[T]. Hence A[¬A[T]] ` ¬¬A[T]. By letting A be A[¬X] and B be¬¬A[T] in Lemma 4.3(1), we have A[¬¬¬A[T]],¬¬A[T] `
A[¬T]. Hence we have A[¬A[T]],¬¬A[T] ` A[F]. Combining them, we have A[¬A[T]] ` A[F].
From the right-hand side to the left-hand side. By letting A be A[¬X] and B be ¬¬A[T] in Lemma 4.3(1), we have
¬¬A[T], A[¬T] ` A[¬¬¬A[T]]. Hence we have the claim.
(2) We have A[¬A[T]] a` ¬¬A[T] ∧ A[F] from (1). By putting ¬, we have ¬A[¬A[T]] a` ¬(¬¬A[T] ∧ A[F]). By putting
¬¬ inside the right-hand side, by Lemma 4.2(2)(3), we have the claim ¬A[¬A[T]] a` ¬(¬¬A[T] ∧ ¬¬A[F]).
(3) The direction from the right-hand side to the left-hand side immediately follows from (2).
The direction from the left-hand side to the right-hand side. By Lemma 4.3(1), we have ¬A, X ` ¬A[T]. Hence we get
¬A, X ` ¬A[T] ∨˜ ¬A[F]. By Lemma 4.3(3), we similarly have ¬A,¬X ` ¬A[T] ∨˜ ¬A[F]. Hence we have X ∨˜ ¬X,¬A `
¬A[T] ∨˜ ¬A[F]. By Lemma 4.2(5), we have ¬A ` ¬A[T] ∨˜ ¬A[F]. By (∃E), we have the claim.
(4) The direction from the left-hand side to the right-hand side is proved by (∀E).
The direction from the right-hand side to the left-hand side. By Lemma 4.3(1), we have ¬A[T], X ` ¬A. Hence
we get ¬A[T] ∧ ¬A[F], X ` ¬A. By Lemma 4.3(3), we similarly have ¬A[T] ∧ ¬A[F],¬X ` ¬A. Hence we have
¬A[T] ∧ ¬A[F], X ∨˜ ¬X ` ¬A. Since we have X ∨˜ ¬X by Lemma 4.2(5), we get ¬A[T] ∧ ¬A[F] ` ¬A. By (∀I), we have
the claim. 
Remark. (1) The claim (3) does not hold if we have implication in the system. A counterexample is A := ¬(X→⊥→ Y ).
Then the left-hand side holds by taking⊥→ Y as X , but the right-hand side is equivalent to ((⊥→ Y )→⊥)→⊥, which
is Peirce’s formula in minimal logic.
(2)We could not directly prove the claim (3)without the claim (2) because the left-hand side has an existential quantifier
and the right-hand side is negated by the abbreviation.
(3) The claim (4) does not hold if we have implication in the system. A counterexample is A := X →⊥→ Y . Assume
the claim (4). The right-hand side is equivalent to¬(⊥→ Y ). By taking⊥→ Y to be X , the left-hand side implies⊥. Hence
¬(⊥→ Y ) ` ⊥. Therefore we have ` ¬¬(⊥→ Y ), which is Peirce’s formula in minimal logic.
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The next lemma gives quantifier elimination.
Lemma 4.5. In J¬ ∧ ∀∃, for a given formula A, we effectively get a natural number f such that (1) if f is 0, then Aa`∀XX, and (2)
if f is 1, then we effectively get variables X1, . . . , Xn (n ≥ 0) and a quantifier-free formula B such that Aa` X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧¬B
holds.
Proof. By induction on A. Wewill give f . If f = 0, wewill show Aa`∀XX . If f = 1, wewill give EX and B such that Aa`EX∧¬B
holds.
Case X . Let f be 1, EX be X , and B be F.
Case⊥. Let f be 1, EX be empty, and B be T.
Case ¬A1. By the induction hypothesis we have f1 for A1.
Case 1. f1 = 0. We let f be 1, EX be empty, and B be F. T a` ¬∀XX holds since we have ` ¬∀XX .
Case 2. f1 = 1 and A1 a` EX1 ∧ ¬B1. Let f be 1, EX be empty, and B be EX1 ∧ ¬B1.
Case A1 ∧ A2. By the induction hypothesis we have f1 and f2 for A1 and A2 respectively.
Case 1. f1 = 0 or f2 = 0. We let f be 0. We have A a` ∀XX , since A1 a` ∀XX or A2 a` ∀XX .
Case 2. f1 = 1 and f2 = 1. By the induction hypothesis, we have EX1, B1, EX2, B2 such that A1a`EX1∧¬B1 and A2a`EX2∧¬B2.
Let f be 1, EX be EX1 ∧ EX2, and B be B1 ∨˜ B2.
Case ∀XA1. By the induction hypothesis we have f1 for A1.
Case 1. f1 = 0. We let f be 0. We have A a` ∀XX , since A1 a` ∀YY .
Case 2. f1 = 1. By the induction hypothesis, we get X1, . . . , Xn and B1 such that A1 a` X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧ ¬B1.
Case 2.1. X ∈ {X1, . . . , Xn}. We can suppose X = X1 and X 6= Xi (1 < i). Let f be 0.We have ∀X1(X1∧· · ·∧Xn∧¬B1)a`
∀X1X1 because of ∀ and X1.
Case 2.2. X 6∈ {X1, . . . , Xn}. Let f be 1, EX be X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn, and B be¬(¬B1[T] ∧¬B1[F]). Then we have ∀XA1 a` X1 ∧ · · · ∧
Xn ∧ ∀X¬B1. By Lemma 4.4(4), we have ∀XA1 a` EX ∧ ¬B.
Case ∃XA1. By the induction hypothesis we have f1 for A1.
Case 1. f1 = 0. We let f be 0. We have A a` ∀XX , since A1 a` ∀YY .
Case 2. f1 = 1. By the induction hypothesis, we have X1, . . . , Xn and B1 such that A1 a` X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧ ¬B1.
Case 2.1. X ∈ {X1, . . . , Xn}. We can suppose X = X1 and X 6= Xi (1 < i). Let f be 1, EX be X2 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn, and B be
B1[X1 := T]. By Lemma 4.3(1), we have X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧ ¬B1 ` X2 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧ ¬B1[X1 := T]. Hence we have ∃X1A1 `
X2∧· · ·∧Xn∧¬B1[X1 := T].We also have X2∧· · ·∧Xn∧¬B1[X1 := T] ` ∃X1A1 since T∧X2∧· · ·∧Xn∧¬B1[X1 := T] ` ∃X1A1.
Hence we have ∃X1A1 a` EX ∧ ¬B.
Case 2.2. X 6∈ {X1, . . . , Xn}. Let f be 1, EX be X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn, and B be¬(¬B1[T] ∨˜ ¬B1[F]). Then we have ∃XA1 a` X1 ∧ · · · ∧
Xn ∧ ∃X¬B1. By Lemma 4.4(3) and 4.2(7), we have ∃XA1 a` EX ∧ ¬B. 
Theorem 4.6 (Quantifier Elimination). In J¬ ∧ ∀∃, for a given formula, we effectively get a natural number f such that (1) if f
is 0, then the formula is equivalent to ∀XX, and (2) if f is 1, then we effectively get some quantifier-free formula equivalent to the
formula.
Proof. For a given formula A, by Lemma 4.5, we have f . If f = 0, A is equivalent to ∀XX . If f = 1, we let A˜ be EX ∧¬B. Then A˜
is quantifier-free and equivalent to A. 
As a byproduct of Lemma 4.4 and Theorem 4.6, we have the next theorem, which says that we can choose the witness
¬A[T] for X in ∃X¬A.
Theorem 4.7 (Second-Order Witness Theorem). The following are provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃.
(1) ∃X¬A a` ¬A[X := ¬A[X := T]].
(2) ∀X¬A a` ¬A[X := ¬¬A[X := T]].
Proof. (1) By Theorem 4.6, we have f for A. If f = 0, then we have A a` ∀XX and both sides of the claim are equivalent to
T. Hence the claim holds. Suppose f = 1. Then by Theorem 4.6, we have a quantifier-free formula A˜ which is equivalent to
A. By Lemma 4.4(2) for A˜, we have¬A˜[¬A˜[T]] a`¬A˜[T] ∨˜ ¬A˜[F]. By Lemma 4.4(3) for A˜, we have ∃X¬A˜a`¬A˜[T] ∨˜ ¬A˜[F].
By combining them, we have ∃X¬A˜ a` ¬A˜[¬A˜[T]]. By A a` A˜, we have the claim.
(2) By Theorem 4.6, we have f for A. If f = 0, then we have A a` ∀XX and both sides of the claim are equivalent to T.
Hence the claim holds. Suppose f = 1. Then by Theorem 4.6, we have a quantifier-free formula A˜ which is equivalent to
A. By letting A be ¬A˜ in Lemma 4.4(1), we have ¬A˜[¬¬A˜[T]] a` ¬¬¬A˜[T],¬A˜[F]. Hence ¬A˜[¬¬A˜[T]] a` ¬A˜[T] ∧ ¬A˜[F]
holds. By Lemma 4.4(4) for A˜, we have ∀X¬A˜a`¬A˜[T] ∧¬A˜[F]. By combining them, we have ∀X¬A˜a`¬A˜[¬¬A˜[T]]. Since
A˜ a` A, we have the claim. 
The claim (1) of this theorem says that given a formula ∃X¬A, we can always take ¬A[T] for X . We can find the witness
only from the shape of the formula. In the first-order intuitionistic predicate logic, given a proof of a formula ∃xA, we can
find a term t such that A[x := t] holds. On the other hand, in our system, even without any proof of ∃X¬A, we can find its
witness by using only the shape of a given formula. The claim (2) says that given a formula ∀X¬A, it is sufficient to take
¬¬A[T] for X . We do not have to think of all the possible formulas for X; it is enough to think of ¬¬A[T] instead. We call
¬A[T] in (1) and ¬¬A[T] in (2) magic formulas, since they are magical.
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5. The decidability theorem
We will prove the decidability theorem given in Section 2.
A proof in J¬ ∧ ∀∃ is called normal when it is normal with respect to β-reduction and permutative conversions [11]. In
order to show Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4(2), we will use the existence of a normal proof for every provable judgment, which is
given by the next theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Existence of a Normal Proof). In J¬ ∧ ∀∃, for every provable judgment, there exists its normal proof.
This theorem is proved by using strong normalization in the second-order natural deduction with→,∧,∨,∀, ∃ proved in
the reference [11].
We will use a propositional logical system J¬∧ corresponding to our system. It is a fragment of minimal propositional
logic.
Definition 5.2. The logical system J¬∧ is defined as the logical system obtained from J¬ ∧ ∀∃ by deleting ∀ and ∃.
Lemma 5.3. For quantifier-free Γ and A, the judgment Γ ` A is provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃ if and only if Γ ` A is provable in J¬∧.
Proof. From the left-hand side to the right-hand side. By Theorem 5.1, Γ ` A has a normal proof. Like for the subformula
property, we can show this proof does not contain ∀ or ∃. Hence Γ ` A is provable in J¬∧.
The right-hand side trivially implies the left-hand side. 
Lemma 5.4. (1) If Γ ` A has a normal proof pi in J¬ ∧ ∀∃, the last rule of pi is not an introduction rule, and Γ does not contain
X, ∀, or ∃, then A does not contain X, ∀, or ∃.
(2) If Γ is quantifier-free, then Γ ` ∀XX is not provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃.
Proof. (1) Assume that A contains X , ∀, or ∃. We will show a contradiction. We consider cases according to the last rule in
pi .
Case of the assumption rule. It is not the case since A is not in Γ .
Case (¬E). It is not the case since A is not⊥.
Cases (∧E1), (∧E2) and (∀E). These cases are proved by the induction hypothesis.
Case (∃E). This case is proved by induction for the first subproof.
(2) Assume Γ ` ∀XX . We will show a contradiction. By Theorem 5.1, we have the normal proof pi of Γ ` ∀XX . We
consider cases according to the last rule.
If the last rule is not an introduction rule, we have a contradiction by (1).
If the last rule is an introduction rule, pi is
Γ.... pi1
X
∀XX (∀I)
where X is not in Γ . The last rule of pi1 is not an introduction rule since the conclusion is a variable. Hence we have a
contradiction by (1) for pi1. 
Theorem 5.5 (Decidability of Provability). In J¬ ∧ ∀∃, for given formulas B1, . . . , Bn, A, we can effectively decide whether
B1, . . . , Bn ` A is provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃ or not.
Proof. By Theorem 4.6, we have fi and f for Bi and A respectively.
Case 1. fi = 0 for some i. B1, . . . , Bn ` A is provable, since we have Bi a` ∀XX .
Case 2. fi = 1 for all i and f = 0. By Theorem 4.6, we have some quantifier-free formulas B˜1, . . . , B˜n which are
equivalent to the formulas B1, . . . , Bn respectively. B1, . . . , Bn ` A is not provable, since B˜1, . . . , B˜n ` ∀XX is not provable
by Lemma 5.4(2).
Case 3. fi = 1 for all i and f = 1. By Theorem 4.6, we have some quantifier-free formulas B˜1, . . . , B˜n, A˜ which are
equivalent to the formulas B1, . . . , Bn, A respectively. Let Γ be B1, . . . , Bn and Γ˜ be B˜1, . . . , B˜n. By Lemma 5.3, Γ˜ ` A˜ is
provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃ if and only if Γ˜ ` A˜ is provable in J¬∧. The right-hand side is decidable by the decidability of the
provability in the minimal propositional logic. Hence the left-hand side is also decidable. Therefore the provability of Γ ` A
in J¬ ∧ ∀∃ is decidable. 
Finally we prove the decidability theorem for λ¬ ∧ ∀∃ given in Section 2.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The claim immediately follows from Theorem 5.5. 
We will show other properties obtained from the quantifier elimination.
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We will write K¬ ∧ ∀∃ for the classical logic obtained from J¬ ∧ ∀∃ by adding the following rule (⊥C):
[¬A]....⊥
A
(⊥C)
We will also write K¬∧ for the classical logic obtained from J¬∧ by adding the rule (⊥C).
We have Glivenko’s theorem.
Theorem 5.6 (Glivenko’s Theorem). B1, . . . , Bn `K¬ ∧ ∀∃ A implies¬¬B1, . . . ,¬¬Bn `J¬ ∧ ∀∃ ¬¬A.
Proof. LetΓ be B1, . . . , Bn. By applying Theorem 4.6 to B1, . . . , Bn, A, we get numbers f1, . . . , fn, f respectively.We consider
cases according to fi, f .
Case 1. fi = 0 for some i. We have Bi a` ∀XX . Hence Γ `J¬ ∧ ∀∃ A holds. Therefore we have the claim.
Case 2. fi = 1 for all i. By Theorem 4.6, we have quantifier-free formulas B˜1, . . . , B˜n. Let Γ˜ be B˜1, . . . , B˜n and ¬¬Γ˜ be
¬¬B˜1, . . . ,¬¬B˜n.
Case 2.1. f = 0.
By ∀XX ` ⊥ in K¬ ∧ ∀∃, we have Γ˜ ` ⊥. Since it is a true propositional judgment, it is proved in K¬∧. By Glivenko’s
theorem for minimal propositional logic, we have ¬¬ Γ˜ ` ¬¬⊥ in J¬∧. By ¬¬⊥ ` ⊥ and ⊥ ` ¬¬∀XX in J¬ ∧ ∀∃, we
have ¬¬ Γ˜ ` ¬¬∀XX in J¬ ∧ ∀∃. Hence we have the claim.
Case 2.2. f = 1. By Theorem 4.6, we also have a quantifier-free formula A˜. Then we have Γ˜ ` A˜ in K¬ ∧ ∀∃. Since it is
quantifier-free, it is provable in K¬∧. By Glivenko’s theorem for propositional minimal logic, we have¬¬Γ˜ ` ¬¬A˜ in J¬∧.
Hence we have the claim. 
We have the double-negation-shift property. We also have the implication from the negation of universal quantification
to existential quantification even in intuitionistic logic.
Theorem 5.7 (Double Negation Shift). (1) ∀X¬¬A ` ¬¬∀XA is provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃.
(2) ¬∀XA ` ∃X¬A is provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃.
Proof. (1) We have ∀X¬¬A ` ∀XA in K¬ ∧ ∀∃. By Theorem 5.6, we have¬¬∀X¬¬A ` ¬¬∀XA in J¬ ∧ ∀∃. Hence we have
the claim.
(2) We have ¬A ` ∃X¬A. Hence ¬∃X¬A ` ¬¬A holds. Therefore ¬∃X¬A ` ∀X¬¬A holds. By (1) with this, we have
¬∃X¬A ` ¬¬∀XA. Hence we have ¬∀XA ` ¬¬∃X¬A.
By Theorem 4.7(1), we have ∃X¬A a` ¬A[¬A[T]]. Hence we have ¬¬∃X¬A a` ∃X¬A.
By combining these, we have the claim. 
Recently Sakagawa and Kashima independently showed the following claim by using sequent calculus. We can give a
simple proof for it from Lemma 4.5.
Theorem 5.8 (Conservativity). `J¬ ∧ ∀∃ A if and only if `K¬ ∧ ∀∃ A.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the right-hand side implies the left-hand side. By Lemma 4.5, we have the number f for
A. We have f = 1 since ` ∀XX is not provable in K¬ ∧ ∀∃. Then we have X1, . . . , Xn, B such that A a` X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧ ¬B
in J¬ ∧ ∀∃. Hence we have `K¬ ∧ ∀∃ X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧ ¬B. Therefore we have n = 0 and A is ¬B. By Theorem 5.6, we have`J¬ ∧ ∀∃ A. 
6. The logical system with¬ ∧ ∃
This section discusses the logical system with ¬ ∧ ∃. We will show a simpler statement for the quantifier elimination
theorem.
The logical system J¬ ∧ ∃ is defined as the system obtained from J¬ ∧ ∀∃ by deleting ∀ from its language.
We will write K¬ ∧ ∃ for the classical logic obtained from J¬ ∧ ∃ by adding the rule (⊥C).
For the quantifier elimination theorem we will have a statement for J¬ ∧ ∃ simpler than that for J¬ ∧ ∀∃. We will also
simplify a statement for the quantifier elimination lemma.
Lemma 6.1. In J¬ ∧ ∃, for a given formula A, we effectively get variables X1, . . . , Xn (n ≥ 0) and a quantifier-free formula B
such that A a` X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧ ¬B holds.
Proof. This is proved in a similar way to Lemma 4.5. Since we do not have ∀, we always have only the case f = 1. 
Theorem 6.2 (Quantifier Elimination). In J¬ ∧ ∃, for a given formula, we effectively get an equivalent quantifier-free formula.
Proof. Let A be a given formula. By Lemma 6.1 for A, we have EX and B. We let A˜ be EX ∧¬B. Then A˜ a` A and A˜ is quantifier-
free. 
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By using the quantifier elimination, we will have the same theorems as for J¬ ∧ ∀∃ also in this system. We list them
below. Each of these theorems is proved in a similar way to J¬ ∧ ∀∃.
Theorem 6.3 (Decidability of Provability). In J¬ ∧ ∃, for given formulas B1, . . . , Bn, A, we can effectively decide whether
B1, . . . , Bn ` A is provable in J¬ ∧ ∃ or not.
Theorem 6.4 (Second-Order Witness Theorem). ∃X¬A a` ¬A[X := ¬A[X := T]] holds in J¬ ∧ ∃.
Theorem 6.5 (Glivenko’s Theorem). B1, . . . , Bn `K¬ ∧ ∃ A implies ¬¬B1, . . . ,¬¬Bn `J¬ ∧ ∃ ¬¬A.
Theorem 6.6 (Conservativity). `J¬ ∧ ∃ A if and only if `K¬ ∧ ∃ A.
7. Decidability with⊥
This section investigates the type system λ¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ and the logical system J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥.
We define the type system λ¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ by adding new terms 〈⊥,M〉 and a new inference rule (⊥E) to λ¬ ∧ ∀∃.
λ-terms in λ¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ are defined by
M,N, . . . ::= x|λx.M|MM|〈M,M〉|pi0M|pi1M|〈∃,M〉|M[x.M]|〈⊥,M〉.
The inference rules in λ¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ are those in λ¬ ∧ ∀∃ and the rule (⊥E) given by
M : ⊥
〈⊥,M〉 : A (⊥E).
We will show the decidability of the inhabitation in this system later in this section. In order to do that, we will study
the logical system J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ that corresponds to λ¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥. This system is obtained from J¬ ∧ ∀∃ by adding the rule (⊥E)
given by
⊥
A
(⊥E).
We will also show the decidability of the provability in this system later in this section.
First, we note that the following theorems for J¬ ∧ ∀∃ automatically hold also for J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ since the language of
J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ is the same as that of J¬ ∧ ∀∃ and J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ has more inference rules.
Theorem 7.1 (Second-Order Witness Theorem). The following are provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥.
(1) ∃X¬A a` ¬A[X := ¬A[X := T]].
(2) ∀X¬A a` ¬A[X := ¬¬A[X := T]].
Theorem 7.2 (Glivenko’s Theorem). B1, . . . , Bn `K¬ ∧ ∀∃ A implies ¬¬B1, . . . ,¬¬Bn `J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ ¬¬A.
Theorem 7.3 (Double Negation Shift). (1) ∀X¬¬A ` ¬¬∀XA is provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥.
(2) ¬∀XA ` ∃X¬A is provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥.
Theorem 7.4 (Conservativity). `J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ A if and only if `K¬ ∧ ∀∃ A.
For the quantifier elimination lemma and the decidability proof, we will have a simpler statement and a simpler proof
for J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ as compared with those for J¬ ∧ ∀∃, since we have ∀XX a` ⊥ in J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥.
Lemma 7.5. In J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥, for a given formula A, we effectively get variables X1, . . . , Xn (n ≥ 0) and a quantifier-free formula
B such that A a` X1 ∧ · · · ∧ Xn ∧ ¬B holds.
Proof. By Lemma 4.5, we have the number f for A. If f = 0, then we let EX be empty and B be T. If f = 1, Lemma 4.5 gives EX
and B. 
Theorem 7.6 (Decidability of Provability). In J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥, for given formulas B1, . . . , Bn, A, we can effectively decide whether
B1, . . . , Bn ` A is provable in J¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ or not.
Proof. By using Lemma 7.5, this is proved in the same way as Case 3 in the proof of Theorem 5.5. 
Theorem 7.7 (Decidability of Inhabitation). The inhabitation in the system λ¬ ∧ ∀∃⊥ is decidable.
Proof. This is proved by the previous theorem. 
8. The second-order witness theorem
This section will show that the second-order witness theorem given in Section 4 holds in various other systems.
First we give the definition of second-order natural deduction NJ2. We have second-order variables X, Y , Z, . . .. The
formulas are defined by
A, B, . . . ::= X |⊥|¬A|A ∧ A|A ∨ A|A→ A|∀XA|∃XA.
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The inference rules of the system are given by
[A]....⊥
¬A (¬I)
¬A A
⊥ (¬E)
[A]....
B
A→ B (→I)
A→ B A
B
(→E)
A B
A ∧ B (∧I)
A ∧ B
A
(∧E1) A ∧ BB (∧E2)
A
A ∨ B (∨I1)
B
A ∨ B (∨I2)
A ∨ B
[A]....
C
[B]....
C
C
(∨E)
A
∀XA (∀I)
∀XA
A[X := B] (∀E)
A[X := B]
∃XA (∃I)
∃XA
[A]....
C
C
(∃E)
⊥
A
(⊥E)
where the assumptions of the subproof of A do not contain any free occurrence of X in the rule (∀I), and neither the
assumptions of the second subproof of C except A, nor C does not contain any free occurrence of X in the rule (∃E).
Next we define a fragment of NJ2. Let S be a subset of the set {∨,→,∀, ∃}. We define the intuitionistic logical system J(S)
with the connectives S as the system obtained from NJ2 by restricting its language to only the logical connectives ⊥,¬,∧
and the logical connectives in S.
Lemma 8.1. The following are provable in J(S).
(1) B, A[X := B] a` B, A[X := T].
(2) ¬B, A[X := B] a` ¬B, A[X := F].
Proof. (1) The claim is proved in a similar way to Lemma 4.3(1).
(2) By induction on A. We will discuss only an interesting case.
Case A = X . We have to show that ¬B, B a` ¬B, F. For the implication from the left-hand side to the right-hand side,
F is proved by (¬E) with ¬B and B. For the implication from the right-hand side to the left-hand side, B is proved by (⊥E)
with F. 
Remark. The claim (2) holds instead of Lemma 4.3(2)(3) because of (⊥E).
Lemma 8.2. In J(S), the following hold.
(1) A[X := ¬A[X := T]] a` ¬¬A[X := T], A[X := F].
(2) ¬A[X := ¬A[X := T]] a` ¬A[X := T] ∨˜ ¬A[X := F].
(3) ∃X¬A a` ¬A[X := T] ∨˜ ¬A[X := F] if S contains ∃.
(4) ∀X¬A a` ¬A[X := T] ∧ ¬A[X := F] if S contains ∀.
Proof. The claims (1) and (2) are proved in the same way as the claims (1) and (2) in Lemma 4.4.
The claims (3) and (4) are proved in the sameway as the claims (3) and (4) in Lemma 4.4 except thatwe use Lemma 8.1(2)
instead of Lemma 4.3(3). 
Theorem 8.3 (Second-Order Witness Theorem). (1) ∃X¬A a` ¬A[X := ¬A[X := T]] is provable in J(S) if S contains ∃.
(2) ∀X¬A a` ¬A[X := ¬¬A[X := T]] is provable in J(S) if S contains ∀.
Proof. (1) By Lemma 8.2(2), we have ¬A[¬A[T]] a` ¬A[T] ∨˜ ¬A[F]. By Lemma 8.2(3), we have ∃X¬A a` ¬A[T] ∨˜ ¬A[F].
By combining them, we have ∃X¬A a` ¬A[¬A[T]].
(2) By letting A be¬A in Lemma 8.2(1), we have¬A[¬¬A[T]]a`¬¬¬A[T],¬A[F]. Hence¬A[¬¬A[T]]a`¬A[T]∧¬A[F]
holds. By Lemma 8.2(4) for A, we have ∀X¬A a` ¬A[T] ∧ ¬A[F]. By combining them, we have ∀X¬A a` ¬A[¬¬A[T]]. 
We define the classical logical system K(S) with the connectives S as the system obtained from J(S) by adding the rule
(⊥C).
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Theorem 8.4 (Second-Order Classical Witness Theorem). (1) ∃XA a` A[X := A[X := T]] is provable in K(S) if S contains ∃.
(2) ∀XA a` A[X := ¬A[X := T]] is provable in K(S) if S contains ∀.
Proof. Wehave Aa`¬¬A in K(S). The claims (1) and (2) immediately follow by letting A be¬A in the previous theorem. 
The claim (1) of this theorem says that given a formula ∃XA, we can always take A[T] for X . We can find the witness only
from the shape of the formula. The claim (2) says that given a formula ∀XA, it is sufficient to take ¬A[T] for X . We do not
have to think of all the possible formulas for X; it is enough to think of¬A[T] instead.
9. Concluding remarks
We showed that the inhabitation in the type system with negation, product, polymorphic, and existential types is
decidable. In order to do that, we investigated the corresponding logical system which is obtained from the second-order
natural deduction by removing implication and disjunction, and proved the decidability of its provability by showing the
quantifier elimination and reducing it to the provability in propositional logic. The magic formulas were used for proving
the quantifier elimination such that they replaced quantifiers. The magic formulas also proved the second-order witness
theorem.
Futureworkwill be extending our quantifier elimination to (1) predicate logical systems, and (2) programming languages.
The magic formulas and the quantifier elimination theorem can be extended to various other systems, since they are
shown by using only simple arguments. If we can apply this to predicate logic, we may find a new relationship between
second-order logic and first-order logic.
In programming languages, polymorphic types give types for polymorphic functions and existential types give types for
abstract data types. If we can apply this to programming languages, some polymorphic functions and some abstract data
types will be typed without polymorphic types or existential types. This would improve the efficiency of programming
languages.
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